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The Nineteenth-Century Criminal Jury: 
Kentucky in the Context of the American 
Experience 
Robert M. Ireland 
ln many ways the petit jury formed the most crucial element of the 
criminal justice system of nineteenth-century America. While in 
matters of civil law juries steadily lost power to trial judges, in 
matters of criminal law they generally gained. Historians have 
made much of the development which saw judges gradually 
establish the right to give juries theoretically binding instructions in 
criminal trials . During the first half of the century juries in many 
states successfully maintained the right to act as the judges of both 
the law and the facts of criminal cases . Thereafter many state 
appellate courts, spurred on by Lemuel Shaw's controversial yet 
highly influential opinion in Commonwealth v . Porter in 1845, 
began to claim for trial judges the right to determine the law of the 
case. Bitter debate accompanied some of these efforts, as, for 
example, in Massachusetts, where reformers attempted 
unsuccessfully in 1853 to repeal the Porter decision by 
constitutional amendment. Kentucky accomplished by statute what 
Shaw had done by judicial decision. After the Constitutional 
Convention of 1849 rejected a proposed provision in the new 
charter which would have expressly given to the jury the right to 
act as judge of law as well as fact, the drafters of the criminal code 
of practice of 1854 gave judges the right to instruct juries in 
writing. Yet while the Court of Appeals held in 1858 that judges 
were the determiners of the law in criminal cases, it also recognized 
that juries had the power to ignore instructions and determine the 
law for themselves. The evidence suggests that they freely did this, 
both in the nation as a whole and in Kentucky in particular. In 
addition, legislatures and constitutional conventions throughout the 
nineteenth century gradually took from trial judges in many states 
their right to comment on the weight of the evidence, a power that 
gave them much greater influence over juries than did the right to 
instruct. On balance, nineteenth-century criminal juries gained 




power at the expense of judges, which meant that they had more 
control than ever over the fate of criminal defendants. 1 
To some, the greater control of juries over criminal verdicts 
helped produce a climate of permissiveness towards criminals, 
especially murderers. "The constantly increasing difficulty of 
procuring convictions on indictment for murder, when there is no 
real doubt of the guilt of the accused, is another encouragement to 
the commission of capital offenses," proclaimed the New Englander 
in 1844, sounding a theme common to commentators on the jury 
system in many states during the nineteenth century. Following the 
acquittal of a notorious criminal indicted for assault with intent to 
kill, a St. Louis judge in 1896 ordered the defendant's burglary tools 
returned to him and announced that there was not "much use in 
maintaining courts when juries return such verdicts." New Yorkers 
continually chided criminal juries of their state for ignoring the 
instructions of judges and reaching verdicts contrary to the logic of 
the case. In 1858 the New York Times described the verdict of a 
jury which found a killer of a constable guilty of first-degree 
manslaughter as " the most absurd as is possible to imagine . . . . 
they might as well have brought in a verdict for horse-stealing." 
Three years later the North American Review contended that 
another New York jury had "disregarded" its oath in finding a 
mother, who had drowned her newborn baby, guilty only of 
second-degree manslaughter, a crime which required the 
perpetrator to have killed in a fit of passion. The same journal 
marvelled at a jury's inconsistency in a trial of a brother and sister 
for the murder of the sister's husband. Although both seemed 
equally guilty, the jury found the brother guilty of first-degree 
murder and the sister only of second-degree manslaughter. 
According to 'T.M.C." (probably Thomas Mcintyre Cooley, the 
famous Michigan legal scholar and jurist), writing in the American 
Law Register, criminal jury verdicts in the nation as a whole fit 
well within the "curious," "absurd," and "erroneous" mold of New 
York.2 
The independence of juries in Kentucky likewise contributed to 
its homicide problem, in the opinion of many observers. Reflecting 
in 1879 on his long sojourn in the state from 1830 to 1868, Bishop 
Benjamin B. Smith concluded that '-'no jury can anywhere be found 
who will bring in a verdict of guilty of anything worse than 'done 
in a state of delirium' or in 'self-defense,' or in effect justifiable 
homicide." 'Time and time again" Smith had seen "the verdict of 
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justifiable homicide brought in cases which by we of New England 
and the North would be considered cold-blooded murder." The 
ever-critical Louisville Commercial found the state's jury system to 
be "rotten and corrupt" with particular weakness towards accused 
murderers. In 1879 the Lexington Transcript condemned the 
system's "leniency, " a sentiment echoed by many of the state's other 
newspapers. Two years later the Kentucky Yeoman proclaimed an 
oft-repeated assumption that juries were much harder on horse-
thieves than murderers. In 1882, A.E. Wilson, a Louisville attorney, 
pronounced juries soft on killers, while two years later Asher 
Caruth, commonwealth's attorney for Jefferson County, in a closing 
statement to a jury stated that previous juries had "disgraced" the 
county by allowing "red-handed murderers to go scot-free .... " 
About the same time, a state senator proclaimed that "popular 
confidence in juries had been seriously jeopardized .... " A delegate 
to the Constitutional Convention of 1890-1891 concluded that juries 
had done more to undermine public confidence in the state's 
criminal justice system than almost any other single influence. 3 
A variety of causes accounted for the deficiencies in the jury 
systems of Kentucky and the nation. To begin with, the method of 
gathering jurors had shortcomings both in form and execution. 
Kentucky's jury-gathering apparatus appears to have been typical. 
Until 1836 sheriffs depended solely upon bystanders who were 
supposed to be housekeepers "possessed of a visible estate, real or 
personal, of the value of twenty pounds at least ." Governor John 
Breathitt, among others, found this method "not well adapted to a 
correct administration of the law," noting that it forced the sheriff 
to "summon those with whom he . . . chanced to meet," some of 
whom were "brought into the court in a state unfit for business. " In 
response to such criticisms, the legislature adopted a new system in 
1836 wherein the sheriff was required to summon thirty "discreet 
citizens of the county, possessing the qualifications required by the 
existing laws .... " In 1837 the legislature reduced the number to be 
summoned to twenty-four and in 1838 it created three jury 
commissioners per county to make an initial selection of one 
hundred residents from which twenty-four names would be selected 
and given to the sheriff via the clerk. In 1852 a new statute 
specified that the trial judge could dismiss the first twenty-four 
summoned after one week's service, to be replaced by a new group 
of twenty-four drawn from the original pool of one hundred. 4 
Although Governor Charles A. Wickliffe announced shortly after 







the reforms of 1836-1838 that they had proved "highly beneficial to 
the administration of justice," subsequent comment suggests 
continued dissatisfaction with the system. An investigative story by 
the Louisville Evening Post in 1879 revealed shortcomings probably 
all too commonplace within the state as a whole. The Post accused 
the sheriff of Jefferson County of shirking his duty by failing to 
summon the persons whose names were given to him by the jury 
commissioners and relying instead on bystanders to form the jury 
panel. Twenty-eight of the thirty persons to be summoned by the 
sheriff had been excused for cause, according to court records. 
When the Post contacted five of those supposedly excused, four of 
them stated that they had never been contacted by the sheriff. 
According to the Commercial the habit of the "responsible 
householder" to refuse to obey his jury summonses and to pay "the 
small fine cheerfully" augmented the tendency of the system to rely 
on bystanders of an inferior calibre. 5 
Kentucky's problems with the implementation of her jury laws 
apparently fit within the mainstream of the nation's 
nineteenth-century experience. The Times continually complained 
of evasions of jury duty by the respectable citizens of New York 
City, leaving the panels to be filled by drunks, crooks, and the 
unemployed. At first evaders simply ignored summonses and paid a 
nominal fine if detected. When the legislature attempted to toughen 
laws following the Civil War, a large number of those called 
continued to avoid service through a variety of ploys including the 
bribery of court officials. Repeated attempts to tighten the laws 
brought only new methods of evasion. Would-be jurors complained 
of poor pay and lost time on the job. Those seeking better juries 
chided businessmen and others of the so-called responsible classes 
for evading an obligation of citizenship, and criticized the 
competence of jury commissioners and other officials. 6 
Similar problems afflicted the jury systems of Illinois, Ohio, 
Missouri, Mississippi, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and if the reports 
of two leading lawyers can be believed, most of the other states of 
the nation. A large number of the respectable citizens of Chicago 
held a meeting in September 1872 to discuss the defects of the 
criminal justice system. Charles Reed, the state's attorney for the 
area, told the gathering that one of the major reasons for the 
inability of government to secure convictions of murderers and 
other hardened criminals was the failure of its own kind to serve 
on juries. Businessmen and others of the "sober and discreet" 
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citizenry went to great lengths to avoid jury duty. In 1868 a foreign 
traveller in Missouri reported being commandeered for jury service 
despite his lack of residency, because the natives traditionally 
avoided the duty whenever possible. Judge R.A. Hill of Mississippi 
wrote to the editors of the Central Law Journal in 1874 that the 
method of selecting jurors in his state had proved defective, with 
sheriffs and their deputies routinely selecting loafers and other 
professional jurors instead of more responsible men. In 1876 the 
Times reported that New Jersey had adopted a commissioner plan 
of jury selection, but that this had proved to be no more 
satisfactory than the old method of relying on sheriffs to do the 
choosing. According to a writer in the North American Review, 
professionals and businessmen seldom appeared on the jury lists of 
Massachusetts, and, when they did, they usually obtained excuses 
from serving. Leading lawyers discussing the problem in the Albany 
Law Journal and American Law Review (in 1885 and 1896 
respectively) revealed a national inattention to jury service.7 
Evasion of service constituted only one of the defects of 
Kentucky's jury system in the opinion of law-and-order advocates. 
The difficulty of convicting murderers increased because the 
prosecution had no peremptory challenges until 1854 and only five 
thereafter, while the defense had twenty . During the first half of the 
century the legislature rejected all attempts to give a small number 
of challenges to the prosecution. The most complete debate on the 
issue occurred at the Constitutional Convention of 1849, where 
reformers insisted that permitting a few peremptory challenges to 
the prosecution would help prevent packed juries. Ben Hardin, with 
the most experience in criminal trials of any delegate, asserted that 
"men are placed upon the jury, sometimes upon their mere 
allegation that they have formed no opinion in the case, and who 
go there predetermined to acquit the accused. " Another declared 
that the absence of peremptory challenges for the prosecution made 
it particularly difficult to convict men of property for murder, 
while a colleague described a system without such privileges as a 
"farce." Archibald Dixon, himself a veteran of many criminal trials, 
attempted to counter such arguments by contending that the 
commonwealth already had too many advantages over the defense 
and did not need any more. He remembered defending a "miserable 
Negro" indicted for the attempted rape and murder of a white 
woman and certain to be convicted and hanged if a fair jury could 
not be obtained. Dixon got his jury, but believed that he could not 
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have if the prosecution had possessed five peremptory challenges. 
Undeterred by Dixon's urgings but not wishing to get bogged down 
in a numbers game, the delegates simply provided that the 
legislature could "pass laws ... regulating the right of challenge of 
jurors in criminal cases."8 
The Code of 1854 did not still the cry of would-be reformers 
who submitted that the prosecution needed more than five 
peremptory challeges to cleanse the jury system. Juries, especially 
those in homicide trials, continued to be polluted with professional 
jurors, courthouse bums, and other low lifes, according to 
observers. More equality between prosecution and defense was 
needed to insure competent jurors, especially in the mountain 
counties where honest men allegedly were not plentiful. Despite 
these pleas and an epidemic of homicide, the legislature defeated all 
attempts to increase the number of peremptory challenges accorded 
the prosecution. 9 
Those outside Kentucky voiced similar complaints about the 
failure of their state legislators to provide an adequate number of 
peremptory challenges to the prosecution. The New Englander 
declared in 1844 that the criminal defendant could exclude from the 
jury "all whose love of justice and firmness of purpose he has 
reason to fear," while the absence of the privilege to the 
prosecution enabled him to bring onto the jury "some conscientious 
but obstinate dunce, whose mind he can imbue with the doctrine of 
reasonable doubt." A. Oakey Hall, district attorney for New York 
City, contended in 1855 that as few as two peremptory challenges 
for the prosecution would help prevent the defense from putting its 
friends on the jury, an all-too-frequent practice under the existing 
system. When examined for bias, the friends simply denied any, 
leaving the prosecutor without grounds to object. Hall also called 
for a reduction in the number of challenges given the defense, 
describing twenty as "excessive." William Howard Taft led the fight 
in Ohio in 1884 to equalize the distribution of challenges, 
submitting that giving the defense twenty-three and the prosecution 
only two "allowed the defendant's counsel to eliminate from all 
panels every man of force and character and standing in the 
community, and to assemble a collection in the jury box of 
nondescripts of no character, weak and amenable to every breeze of 
emotion, however maudlin or irrelevant to the issue." Such a 
condition made it very difficult to convict murderers, he added. A 
writer to the American Law Register in 1877 implied that the 
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disparity that existed in Kentucky, New York, and Ohio prevailed 
in many other states and called for more equality. Some states such 
as New Jersey and New York responded to such efforts and 
equalized, but most others did not, prompting critics to renew their 
attempts in the early twentieth century .10 
Peremptory challenges permitted the defense to strike jurors 
without having to prove they were unfit. Additionally the defense, 
together with the prosecution, had an unlimited right to disqualify 
prospective jurors for cause by demonstrating that they were 
prejudiced. The prior opinion rule made this task all too easy for 
the defense. John Marshall in the Burr treason trial had been one of 
the first American jurists to put in writing a requirement that 
potential jurors be free from fixed opinions about the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant. The New York Supreme Court 
extended this principle much further in the case of People v. Mather 
decided in 1830. In that case the court held that a prospective juror 
was disqualified if he had formed an impression of the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant from reading the newspapers, even 
though his opinion was not fixed and might be changed as a result 
of evidence introduced at the trial. Even though subsequent cases 
seemed to suggest that the opinion formed must have been fixed 
and not simply be an impression, trial courts in a number of states, 
including Kentucky, often invoked the most extreme version of the 
Mather case, allowing disqualification for any opinion formed from 
the reading of a newspaper. 11 
The results of the prior opinion rule in New York apparently 
typified those in many other states. During the anti-rent trials, only 
ten jurors qualified out of the first 4000 examined. In the second 
trial of the Bodine case, prospective jurors eagerly purchased copies 
of any newspaper containing accounts of the crime and some who 
could not acquire them went to lawyers to obtain information on 
the case in order to be disqualified from service. Some years later in 
the Friery case only eleven of the first 565 men summoned qualified 
for service, while in the McFarland murder trial nearly 700 were 
called before a jury was formed. In the midst of this, A. Oakey 
Hall declared that either newspapers would have to be abolished or 
intelligent men could never serve on juries. Kentuckians found that 
the rule worked the same hardships on them, Judge Benjamin F. 
Buckner stating that "skillful lawyers" could weed out most if not 
all who had read about a case and the Stanford Journal concluding 
that "none but the most ignorant and often the most vicious 
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elements of society" were eligible for juries in the commonwealth. 
A writer in the American Law Register declared in 1877 that the 
rule "in some of the states brought serious discredit upon the 
administration of justice" and "derision" on the intelligent jurorY 
Such a permanent condition of ineligibility produced a clamor 
for change of the law. Between 1864 and 1880 a number of states, 
including Indiana, Ohio, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York, 
Iowa, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, and Maryland, by statute 
and court decision abolished or substantially altered the rule so that 
a prospective juror could serve on a jury even if he had formed an 
opinion about the guilt or innocence of the defendant from reading 
the newspapers, if he swore that he would base his decision in the 
case solely on the evidence presented therein. Kentucky followed 
suit in 1888 by amending the Criminal Code of Practice to read that 
no one would be disqualified from jury service if he had formed a 
opinion from "newspaper statements (about the truth of which he 
has expressed no opinion)" as long as he swore to render an 
impartial verdict in accordance with the law and evidence, if the 
court was satisfied with the truth of such statement. 13 
The number of peremptory challenges accorded the defense, the 
emergence of the prior opinion rule, and the reluctance of 
responsible men to serve meant that jury packing was possible in 
most states and flourished in at least some. Defendants, their allies, 
and perhaps their lawyers on occasion made sure that individuals 
sympathetic to their cause were available as bystanders to serve on 
the jury when the regular panel had been exhausted. Even if the 
defense did not deliberately seek to place venal men on the jury, 
the so-called professional jurors, the courthouse loungers with little 
visible means of support who needed the paltry jury fees to survive, 
were readily available for service and too often formed a part of 
the jury. As the defense exercised special vigilance in cases of 
homicide, juries in these trials most often were populated by 
loungers or packed jurors or both.14 
Critics deplored the tendency of stupid and corrupt men to 
dominate the juries of America, especially in trials of great 
importance. Even a delegate to the New York Constitutional 
Convention of 1846 who took a rather sanguine view of the jury 
process admitted that "very many of our courts are haunted, day 
after day, by dissolute loungers, waiting a chance to obtain a 
shilling by getting on a jury, whose integrity and judgment no man 
can confide in, and who are utterly unfit to decide either the law or 
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the facts of any case . .. . " In 1887 a New York judge lamented that 
in many cases the "slums seemed to have been dredged for the 
purpose of getting jurymen." In 1865 the Times pointed to an abuse 
"long sanctioned by the courts of this state" that permitted the 
defense to place allies on the jury in order to deadlock it; "after two 
or three trials of the farce, the man goes free ." Professional jurors 
thrived in Chicago and the District of Columbia, where venal 
jurymen were so rampant that the attorney general ordered all 
important government cases tried in Maryland. A foreign traveller 
in Missouri reported participating in a jury deliberation that had 
difficulty resolving itself because two of the defendant's friends on 
the panel held out for an extremely lenient sentence. The Times 
alleged in 1876 that a company in Buffalo had been organized to 
furnish professional jurors for criminal trials in major cities in the 
East and Midwest, including Chjcago, New York, Philadelphia, 
Boston, and Cincinnati. 15 
Involved as a lawyer and judge in criminal trials for over twenty 
years, Benjamin F. Buckner of Lexington, Kentucky, told a meeting 
of the state bar association in 1879 that as a rule the more serious 
the crime the less adequate the jurors. The president of that 
association, Judge John W. Barr, endorsed these sentiments in 1883 
and deplored the tendency of sheriffs to place cronies and dishonest 
and corrupt bystanders on jury pools because it served their 
political interests and was easiest to do. The Yeoman estimated that 
nine-tenths of Kentucky's criminal juries were packed. Garret 
Davis, an experienced trial lawyer of antebellum Kentucky, in 1849 
told of helping to prosecute in a case involving "one of the most 
diabolical and outrageous murders that was ever perpetrated." 
Despite Davis's efforts to the contrary, the defense placed five 
friends of the defendant on the jury, which found him guilty only 
of manslaughter. For some unspecified reason the judge granted a 
new trial; shortly thereafter the defendant escaped from jail never 
to be heard from again; and three of the former jurors were 
convicted of perjury in a rare example of justice. In the same year, 
a lawyer from Graves County alleged that bribery had made the 
criminal law of Kentucky "little better than a dead letter. . . . and 
set at liberty the veriest murderers and scoundrels that ever 
disgraced the shape of man .... " Ben Hardin remembered a client 
named Carter who was tried for murdering a wealthy boat owner 
and finally pardoned after four juries deadlocked on the question of 
his guilt. After the pardon,. Hardin learned that Carter had packed 










each jury with at least one of his paid friends.l6 
Although probably most defense lawyers did not knowingly 
participate in the packing of juries, they did actively seek to secure 
jurors likely to be sympathetic to the defendant. Joseph G. Baldwin 
recounted in his professional memoirs that antebellum defense 
lawyers from Mississippi and Alabama possessed great skill in the 
matter of securing favorable juries by carefully studying the 
"general character of the men, or from certain discoveries the 
defendant had been enabled to make in his mingling among 'his 
friends and the public generally.' " Usually "the sheriff, too, was a 
friendly man, and not inclined to omit a kind service that was 
likely to be remembered with gratitude at the next election."17 
The process of jury selection in the 1883 trial of Phil Thompson, 
Jr., congressman from Harrodsburg, Kentucky, for the murder of 
Walter Davis furnishes an example of the success of jury packing. 
Because neither the public nor the private prosecutors in the case 
resided in Mercer County, they had little knowledge of the men 
examined for jury service. Certain of the defense counsel, on the 
other hand, lived in Harrodsburg and possessed great familiarity 
with the prospective jurors. One of them, Tom Bell, in the opinion 
of the reporter for the Commercial, seemed "to be a . . . well 
regulated directory to the lineage of every man in the county-a 
... family tree.'' Determined "from the beginning to secure a jury 
as favorable to their client as possible," lawyers for the defendant 
"vigorously examined" every candidate. The possession of only five 
peremptory challenges compared to twenty for the defense further 
handicapped the prosecution, which exhausted its supply early in 
the voir dire . The combination of too few peremptory challenges, 
too little knowledge of the panel, and too much homework by the 
defense produced a jury that was heavily stacked in favor of the 
defendant. The Commercial reporter described five of the jurors as 
friends of the defendant, three of them variously depicted as "a 
longtime friend," a "trusted friend, " and "one of young Phil's 
staunchest supporters." Three others fought eagerly for the 
Confederacy in the Civil War, experience designed to help the 
defendant, who as a mere teenager had ridden with John Hunt 
Morgan. One of the three had the additionally helpful characteristic 
of being himself a celebrated gunfighter. Still another had fought 
with Thompson's father in the Mexican War and was known to 
keen observers to have been a veteran juror who was soft on 
criminals. A tenth had worked in the defendant's cooper shop in 
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Lexington, and his brother worked there at the time of the trial as 
foreman . So proficient was the defense and so unprepared the 
prosecution that one Isaac Pearson, described as a " trusted friend" 
of the defendant and a friend and client of his father, protested 
after being seated in the box following only one preliminary 
question, that he already had made up his mind about the 
defendant's guilt and wished on that account to be dismissed. But 
the judge ruled that the question of his fitness had been irrevocably 
settled and ordered him to take his seat. Not surprisingly the jury 
found the defendant not guilty after only a brief deliberation .18 
Claiming that they were only seeking to counteract the mass of 
unfavorable publicity generated by their client's highly unpopular 
killing of Court of Appeals Judge John Elliott in 1879, attorneys for 
Thomas Buford before his first trial published and circulated a 
thirty-eight-page pamphlet designed to prove that their client was 
insane at the time of the homicide. In effect the publication 
embodied the essence of the argument from the defendant; namely, 
that a disappointing lawsuit "aroused within him that violent devil 
of insanity, never, from his earliest boyhood, entirely dormant 
within him, and which all who are acquainted with him and his 
family well know it was his exceedingly great misfortune to have 
honestly inherited. " The trial judge threatened contempt 
proceedings if "the emotional pamphlet" were circulated during the 
term.19 
During the trial of Matt Ward in 1854 for the murder of a 
Louisville schoolteacher who had whipped his little brother, 
advocates of the defendant's guilt asserted that his supporters had 
bribed or otherwise tampered with some of his jury. The Louisville 
Daily Courier thought it strange that the first juror seated was the 
twelfth examined, even though he was not among the first fifty men 
selected by the jury commissioners. It also claimed that some of the 
jurors were bribed, an allegation hotly denied by the jurors 
themselves. One of the prosecutors accused the Ward partisans of 
inviting substantial numbers of the residents of Hardin County, 
where the trial was held, to visit the defendant in jail in hopes he 
would arouse their sympathies. Supposedly the Baptist Church of 
Elizabethtown expelled one of the jurors after it was "conclusively 
proved that before the trial he had repeatedly expressed an opinion" 
on the innocence of the defendant. 20 
Only a few or even a single juror who sympathized with the 
defendant could hang a jury or at the least substantially affect its 




verdict and sentence. In Kentucky, as in certain other states of the 
nineteenth century, juries determined both guilt and the 
punishment. Tried for murder in Jefferson County in 1879, Ed 
Claytor escaped with a conviction for manslaughter and a sentence 
of five years in the penitentiary because two jurors held out for 
acquittal before compromising with eight who voted for the death 
penalty and two who favored confinement for twenty years. In 
another murder case, one juror who favored acquittal forced eleven 
who favored conviction, a majority of them voting for hanging, to 
agree on a two-year prison term for manslaughter. When juries 
could agree on a guilty verdict their procedures for determining 
punishment often proved arbitrary, and their punishments 
inconsistent. More than one cynic accused juries of simply adding 
up the years of confinement each favored and then dividing by 
twelve . Benjamin F. Buckner, a circuit-court judge, recalled a jury 
that decided on a one-year prison term for a man convicted of 
stabbing with intent to kill. In the very next case another jury 
voted for a ten-year prison term for a man convicted of stealing a 
mule worth fifty dollars . The same jury gave a woman thirty days 
in jail for killing her husband and a woman who kept a disorderly 
house twelve months in jail. 21 
Stories abounded in other states about the erratic behavior of 
juries. A California jury reportedly decided a case by a hand of 
poker, while one in Missouri proceeded on the basis of a card game 
known as "seven up." A Minnesota jury allegedly used a large 
quantity of whiskey to facilitate its deliberations, while a Delaware 
panel was reportedly provided with little food and water for fifty-
four hours to force it to reach a verdict in a murder case. A New 
York jury convicted a woman of second- degree murder, which 
required a finding of acting in sudden heat and passion, even 
though it was proved that she slowly poisoned her husband to 
death over a period of several weeks. All of this prompted some, 
including Buckner, to seek a change in the law to provide that the 
judge would determine the punishment. While some states adopted 
such a reform, Kentucky did not. 22 
Until 1873 death constituted the only penalty for a murder 
conviction in Kentucky, and this may have accounted for so many 
acquittals or convictions for manslaughter. In the opinion of the 
Kentucky Yeoman the mandatory death sentence constituted "one 
great cause why so many persons charged with murder are turned 
loose on the community after undergoing trial." Jurors who secretly 
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held doubts about capital punishment often hung juries, resulting in 
the eventual release of killers. The Yeoman believed that an 
amendment to the murder statute providing for an optional life 
imprisonment for those convicted of murder would increase the 
likelihood of such convictions. Some called for the abolition of the 
death penalty, contending that it was only invoked against poor 
whites and Negroes. Reportedly there had been only one hanging in 
Garrard County in twenty-six years, none in Jefferson County in 
thirty, and only one in Floyd County in eighty-five . Others called 
for the end of public hangings, submitting that they did not 
discourage killing but only made heroes out of ruthless killers and 
turned a solemn occasion into a carnival.23 
The legislature did respond to criticisms of the adverse effect of 
the mandatory death penalty by providing in 1873 that upon 
finding a defendant guilty of murder a jury could impose either the 
death penalty or a life sentence in the penitentiary. But this revision 
apparently did not produce more murder convictions, for a group 
of legislators made a determined, albeit unsuccessful effort to revive 
the mandatory death penalty in 1882. Proponents of the revival 
argued that death constituted the only appropriate penalty for 
murder and that few convictions for murder and even fewer 
hangings had occurred since the reform of 1873. Opponents 
admitted that the homicide epidemic had not been deterred by the 
elimination of the mandatory death sentence, but contended that 
the fault lay not with the discretionary penalty provision but with 
permissive juries. 24 
Juries occupied a sacred place in the rhetoric of the American 
Revolution, a tradition that spilled over into the nineteenth century . 
However, the rise in crime and the alleged permissiveness of juries 
towards criminals, particularly murderers, prompted some to call 
for drastic changes in the jury system. The abolition of the prior 
opinion rule and the granting of peremptory challenges to the 
prosecution represented but two of the proposals advanced to 
correct abuses in the selection and operation of juries. Other, more 
radical solutions were offered, but seldom if ever adopted. Some 
chagrined advocates of law and order even endorsed the abolition 
of juries, calling them useless relics of the past. Judges, they 
claimed, possessed the training, expertise, and experience to make 
much more accurate and just decisions in criminal matters. Jurors, 
often semiliterate and disreputable, frequently arrived at illogical, 
sometimes corrupt verdicts unsupported by the evidence. But even 
64 THE KENTUCKY REVIEW 
the severest critics of juries recognized the futility of such proposals 
and most acknowledged the importance of the institution to the 
preservation of American liberty. They proposed, instead, reforms 
that would insure better jurors and more rational verdicts. 2s 
After 1852 certain Kentucky trial judges took advantage of a 
statute passed in that year which permitted them to rotate jury 
panels every week. In order to have an adequate number of jurors, 
judges ordered sheriffs to draw on the reserve lists compiled by jury 
commissioners. This plan also meant sheriffs would have less need 
to call upon bystanders to fill out incomplete panels. The 
Owensboro Messenger reported in 1882 that because of such a plan 
being adopted by the judge of the Daviess Circuit Court "the 
familiar faces of many old stagers are seen no more and their 
interest in court matters has suddenly ceased .... professional 
jurors are a thing of the past." Yet it is doubtful that rotation had 
much effect on homicide juries as most defense attorneys freely 
used peremptory challenges in order to exhaust the regular jury 
list. 26 
Before the prior opinion rule was abolished, trial judges 
sometimes invoked a section of the Criminal Code of Practice 
adopted in 1854 which permitted them to use jurors residing in an 
adjoining county when they were "satisfied" that it would be 
"impracticable to obtain a jury free of bias in the county wherein 
the prosecution" was pending. Although delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention of 1849 rejected an attempt to put such 
a provision in the new constitution, the drafters of the 1854 code 
inserted it nonetheless. Judges occasionally invoked the provision 
with some success, as for example in Breathitt County in 1879 when 
100 men from Magoffin County were called in order to form a jury 
in the trial of alleged murderers of the county judge. The fact that 
trial judges could only utilize outside jurors from adjoining counties 
restricted the effectiveness of the provision since these individuals 
would quite likely have read about notorious crimes committed 
near them. Surprisingly, the printed reports of the Court of Appeals 
contain no cases challenging the constitutionality of the provision 
even though the Constitution of 1850 guaranteed criminal 
defendants the right to a "speedy public trial by an impartial jury 
of the vicinage" and "vicinage" was commonly assumed to mean 
the county in which the trial was to be held. 27 
In an effort to prevent a few jurors from deadlocking a jury or 
forcing it into an illogical and lenient verdict, some supported a 
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reform permitting a non-unanimous verdict even in capital cases. 
The New York Times periodically advocated this change, suggesting 
a two-thirds or a three-fourths majority as possible formulae. A 
lawyer writing in the Albany Law Journal suggested allowing ten 
out of twelve to decide criminal cases, while noted criminal law 
scholar Seymour D. Thompson endorsed the three-fourths plan as 
long as the trial judge certified the· verdict to be lawful and just. 
Occasionally, Kentuckians advanced such a scheme, but in 
Kentucky as elsewhere it never received serious consideration. 28 
Ironically, as debate raged about the merits of the jury and the 
need for reforms a seldom-discussed development was in many 
states rendering the system less significant. Following the Civil War 
in certain metropolitan areas and extending to all areas in some 
states by the end of the century, prosecutors began to plea bargain, 
with increasing numbers of defendants thereby bypassing trials, and 
in many states juries, altogether. Dissatisfaction with the jury 
system seems not to account for this phenomenon, but it obviously 
had the effect of diluting the jury's importance. In Kentucky this 
process proceeded more slowly and incompletely than in some 
other places, especially in homicide cases, which aroused the 
greatest outcry about permissive juries. An examination of the 
order books of the Jefferson County Circuit Court for the years 
1871 to 1872 and 1874 through 1881 reveals only one guilty plea in 
156 homicide cases, while only two occurred in Fayette County 
homicide cases from 1851 through 1890. None occurred in the 
homicide cases of Adair (1831-1890), Morgan (1859-1888), and 
Ohio (1831-1875, 1880-1890) counties for a collective total of 146 
years. In their study of state criminal procedure in 1867, Enoch 
Wines and Theodore Dwight estimated that only one in twenty 
criminal defendants in Kentucky pleaded guilty. 29 
Throughout the nineteenth century Kentuckians and Americans 
in general agonized over the jury system. In some ways the 
institution represented the bulwark of American liberty. In other 
ways it seemed to signify the gradual corruption of the criminal 
justice mechanism. Afraid to abolish an integral part of due 
process, legislators tried through reform to insure that the jury 
would more frequently convict those guilty of heinous crimes such 
as murder. In this quest they were at best only partially successful. 
By the end of the century in at least some states the issue of reform 
was becoming less important as prosecutors were eroding the 
position of the jury through plea bargaining, although in Kentucky 










this process was much more gradual and incomplete than in other 
places. 
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